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Abstract
This paper presents a model of collusion in vertically differenti-
ated industries where firms have the option to make their products
distinguishable to consumers by attaching a brand. We show that if
consumers’ preferences are linear in the quality dimension and their
beliefs satisfy a standard refinement, collusion is facilitated in the ab-
sence of brands. More precisely, we show that if collusion is feasible
with brands it is also feasible without them.
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1 Introduction
Brands allow consumers to relate current products with previous purchasing
experiences. Consumers recognize different brands and attach different values
to the consumption of otherwise identical products. It is well-known that in
so doing, brands ensure firms to have the incentives to provide high quality
products (see e.g. Tadelis (1999), Bar-Isaac (2003)) and allow them to profit
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from economies of scope when introducing new products (Hakenes and Peitz
(2008), Andersson (2002)). In this paper we argue that brands may also
foster competition in markets with vertically differentiated products that are
subject to collusion.
In particular we show that if different firms offer products that are undis-
tinguishable to consumers ex-ante but that differ in their quality ex-post, the
threshold discount factor such that a collusive agreement is implementable
in any (Perfect-Bayesian) Equilibrium satisfying a standard refinement cri-
terion is lower than under distinguishable products. This result rests on two
basic observations. First, if consumers can distinguish different products,
every firm trades at a different price and so increasing the quantity produced
by the lowest-quality firm reduces total profits at a constant rate equal to the
ratio of willingness-to-pay for each product. If products are undistinguish-
able, however, all firms trade at the same price and, therefore, the marginal
rate of substitution between profits is lower so that the Pareto Frontier ex-
pands. Intuitively, high-quality producers cross-subsidize low-quality sellers
by allowing them to charge higher prices.
Second, price deviations if products are undistinguishable require con-
sumers to form beliefs about the identity of the deviator. We restrict such
beliefs to satisfy a standard refinement called Intuitive Criterion. Roughly
speaking, a belief system satisfies the Intuitive Criterion if it puts zero prob-
ability on all types for which an off-the-equilibrium action is dominated by
their equilibrium payoff. Thus, by appropriately crafting the agreement,
firms may ensure that the deviator is believed to be a low-quality producer,
reducing the profitability of such deviation. These two forces reduce the gain
from deviating for all firms and, therefore, reduce the threshold discount
factor that makes the agreement implementable.
This result provides a theoretical link between branding and collusion
in vertically differentiated industries. This link has been found to exist in
a number of Antitrust Cases. For instance, in the Spanish northern region
of Asturias virtually all cider producers were part of a cartel until the late
90s1. Prices were publicly announced through local newspapers and fixed
throughout the year and across sale points. The industry comprised many
small producers offering their (heterogenous) products without any branding:
1Cider is one of the most popular beverages in this region, with an estimated per-person
consumption of over 50 liters per year. For more details see the resolution by the Spanish
Competition Authority 376/96, available at www.cncompetencia.es.
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bottles had no labels in them and only the cork had an identification number
with a code for the producer2. After the Spanish Antitrust Authority fined
the producers for anticompetitive practices, the industry introduced labels
in their bottles and different quality products sold at different prices.
This example is by no means unique. In many agricultural markets,
producers use a Collective Brand based on their location or type of product.
Collective Brands are equivalent to no Brands since consumers are unable to
distinguish the behavior of different producers. In Loureiro and McCluskey
(2000) they argue that Collective Brands are usually related to high prices
and high-quality perceptions by consumers. Fishman et al. (2010) provides
a model of reputation with intermediaries where firms may optimally choose
to brand their product together as a way to induce high effort and higher
prices. Our results provide another interpretation to these phenomena in
terms of collusion rather than reputation vis-a-vis consumers, which may
radically change its welfare effects3
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it is the first paper
that studies the relation between collusion and vertical differentiation with
imperfectly informed consumers. The literature on collusion with differenti-
ated products starting with Jehiel (1992) and Friedman and Thisse (1993)
has focused on games of perfect information where consumers know the lo-
cation of each firm’s product. Since consumers are unable to distinguish
firms, they must form beliefs about the quality offered by suppliers. Second,
it contributes to the policy debate on the effects of brands on competition
by studying the relation between brands and collusion. It provides a ratio-
nale for Competition Authorities to promote the introduction of individual
brands and to restrict the behavior of trade organizations producing under a
Collective Brand in markets with vertically differentiated products. Finally,
on a theoretical level, this model provides one of the few examples where
the so-called unraveling results of disclosure of a vertical dimension by pro-
ducers fails to hold4. In addition, it is the first signalling game where the
off-the-equilibrium path beliefs that some agents hold depend naturally on
an equilibrium object. In particular, consumers’ beliefs about the identity
2Wholesale markets used 12-bottle boxes as their unit. These boxes had a label but
were not easily recognized by consumers
3The use of Collective Brands in agricultural products has been subject ot debate in
the recent rounds of the WTO negotiations.
4To the best of my knowledge the only paper where unraveling does not happen in the
context of vertically differentiated producers and free disclosure is Janssen and Roy (2010)
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of a deviator depends on the collusive agreement that is in place. This is
natural since off-the-equilibrium beliefs that put positive weights on devia-
tors’ types whose equilibrium payoff is higher than their deviation payoff for
any possible belief are ruled out. This condition depends on the equilibrium
agreement and, therefore, firms may adjust the agreement in order to induce
different beliefs about such deviators’ identities.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. We first describe the
baseline model with unit demand and homogenous consumers and sketch
the analysis when consumers are certain of the quality supplied by each
producer. Then we study the role of imperfect information and provide the
main results. Finally, we discuss the robustness of these results to more
general utility functions.
2 Model
We consider an industry populated by a number n of long-lived players (firms)
and a continuum of short-lived players (consumers). Firm i supplies a good of
certain quality xi at a constant unit cost ci. We order firms so that xj > xj+1.
In order to ease the exposition we shall assume that5
xn ≥ max{1
2
x1,max{cj}}. (1)
Each firm’s quality is common knowledge among firms but is ex-ante un-
known to consumers. Consumers derive utility xi − pi if they buy from firm
i at a price pi. Firms live forever and discount the future by δ < 1. The
stage-game is as follows. At the beginning of each period, firms observe the
whole history of events and the realization of a random variable uniformly
distributed in a (finite) interval. Firms simultaneously send a public message
bi,t ∈ {Mi, ∅}. If a firm has sent a message bi,t′ = Mi in any period t′ < t,
then bi,t = i. That is, the message is irreversible. We call this message a
Brand. Once messages are observed, each firm decides whether to stay active
in the period or not, and if they stay active they choose a price pi,t. Inactive
firms obtain zero payoffs and move again next period. Consumers then buy
their preferred product given the information available to them. Let Qt be
their choice, so that if
∑
j Qj ≤ 1.
5None of the results depend on this Assumption, but it greatly reduces the number of
cases to consider.
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2.1 Brands and Histories
A history for the firms up to period t, ht is a collection of firm’s prices {pi,t},
messages {bi,t}, purchasing decisions {Qt} and realizations of the uncertainty
{ωt}, with the normalization that if a price is not active at period t, pi,t =∞.
If no firm has branded its product up to period t− 1, consumers are unable
to distinguish firms from each other. Thus Q(ht) = Q(h
′
t) for all ht, h
′
t such
that bi,s = ∅ for all i and for all s < s′ and such that h′t−1 can be written as
a permutation of ht−1 pi,t = p′i,t for all i. In words, previous names do not
matter without brands. If a firm has branded its product in some previous
period s < t and consumers have purchased from the firm in a period s′ > s,
then all future consumers will know the quality of the firm for sure. Further, I
assume that once a firm has branded its product, consumers can identify the
firm in any history so that I do not longer impose that purchasing decisions
are independent of names.
3 Benchmark: Branded Collusion
If all firms have branded their product and qualities are known, this frame-
work becomes a model of collusion with vertically differentiated firms. Let qˆ
be the collusive agreement so that firm i is active if and only if6∑
j<i
qj < F (ωt) ≤
∑
j≤i
qj (2)
Let vi be the vector of profits in the continuation game after firm i deviates.
Since the punishment scheme is not the main objective of this paper, I shall
leave it unspecified. For future reference notice that under Grim-Trigger
Strategies, the highest-surplus creating firm gets the difference between its
surplus and the second highest surplus while the others get 0. Let such
payoff be v. Under Optimal Penal Codes, vi = 0 for all i. Finally, the IC
constraints require that
δqi(xi − ci) ≥ (1− δ)(xi − ci) + δvii (3)
for all i and for all j 6= i. Let δˆ be the lowest δ such that there exists qˆ
satisfying these IC constraints.
6Similar results can be obtained using market-sharing agreements.
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4 Results without Brands
Next I consider the possibility of establishing collusive agreements without
brands. The agreement can now be broken because a firm who is supposed
to remain non-active stays active or because any given firm brands its prod-
uct. As I will show later, the non-branding constraint is not binding if the
inactive constraint is satisfied. This is because branding is punished contem-
poraneously in the pricing stage by the other firms.
4.1 Pareto Frontier
One of the key difficulties of establishing a collusive agreement under vertical
differentiation stems from the shape of the Pareto Frontier. More productive
firms have to give up more than one unit of their per-period profits for each
unit of per-period profits that less productive firms get. It is well-known
that this can be solved by allowing transfers between firms. In such a case,
the optimal collective agreement requires the most productive firm to sell
in every period and make transfers to all other firms so that their IC are
satisfied. Since transfers across firms are not allowed, however, firms may
avoid brands as a means for cross-subsidizing. Indeed, we show that firms
competing without brands have a strictly larger feasible set of payoff vectors.
Lemma 1. The set of feasible payoff vectors for the firms with brands is a
strict subset of the set of feasible payoff vectors without brands.
Proof. Let q be the agreement without brands and qˆ be the agreement with
brands. Assume that for all firms i = 1, 2, .., n− 1,
qi(
n∑
j=1
qjxj − ci) = qˆi(xi − ci) (4)
it is enough to show that
qn(
n∑
j=1
qjxj − cn) ≥ qˆn(xn − cn). (5)
Substituting
qˆn = 1−
n−1∑
i=1
qi
xi − ci (
n∑
j=1
qjxj − ci) (6)
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Hence, I show that
(1−
n−1∑
i=1
qi
xi − ci (
n∑
j=1
qjxj − ci)(xn − cn) ≤ qn(
n∑
j=1
qjxj − cn) (7)
which can be rewritten as
1−
n−1∑
i=1
qi
xi − ci (
n∑
j=1
qjxj − ci) ≤ qn
xn − cn (
n∑
j=1
qjxj − cn) (8)
This expression is equivalent to
n∑
i=1
qi
xi − ci (
n∑
j=1
qjxj − ci) ≥ 1 (9)
for any qn. Notice that since all xi − ci > 0, LHS is minimized by choosing
qk = 1 for any k and in such case the condition is satisfied trivially.
4.2 Collusive Agreement
For a given equilibrium agreement q, let µ(p) represent the beliefs that con-
sumers have regarding the identity of a firm that offers its product at a price
p. Consistency requires that if in a given period there is only one firm offer-
ing its product and chooses the equilibrium price p∗ =
∑
qjxj, µ(p
∗) = q.
Consumers must also make beliefs regarding non-deviators but I do not need
to impose any structure on such beliefs. Let µ′(p) be the belief attached to
the firm offering the equilibrium price if there is a competitor offering p7 Let
the continuation value of player i be vi. The IC constraint is
δqi(
∑
qjxj − ci) ≥ (1− δ)vi + δ(p− ci) (10)
for all p such that the deviating firm sells its product. Notice that for every
p, there is a set of firms for which the deviation is dominated. I shall require
that beliefs satisfy the Intuitive Criterion so that µ(p) puts zero weight on
those firms. Formally, µi(p) = 0 for all i such that δqi(
∑
qjxj − ci) ≥
7Throughout, and to save notation, I specify the beliefs in case that a single firm
deviated. Beliefs could be extended to multiple deviations in the obvious way.
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(1− δ)vi + δ(p− ci). Finally, notice that given some off-the-equilibrium path
belief, the highest price that a deviator can charge and still sell is.
p˜(µ(p)) =
∑
µi(p)xi −min{0,
∑
(qi − µ′i(p))xi} (11)
Notice that if
∑
(qi − µ′i)xi < 0, the non-deviating firm becomes more at-
tractive but since the price is fixed is offering a positive surplus that the
deviating firm has to meet. On the other hand if
∑
(qi − µ′i)xi > 0, the
non-deviating firm is offering negative surplus and will not sell but the de-
viating firm cannot charge a price above its surplus since consumers would
prefer not to buy. Thus, the set of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs induce a
set of deviating prices that support themselves, as the set of solutions of such
equation. Notice that
pmin = xn −min
q,µ′
∑
(qi − µ′i(p))xi = 2xn − x1 (12)
belongs to the set since consumers know that the quality provided by the
deviator is at least xn and that the other firm is no better than x1. Condition
(1) ensures that such a price is positive. Finally notice that a firm cannot
gain by mimicking the equilibrium price since consumers get no surplus from
buying to this firm.
4.3 Punishment Phase
To conclude the Section, we provide a construction of a strategy profile that
implements harsh punishments for deviators, supporting an equilibrium with-
out brands. Consider any deviation by firm i at a price p. In the following
period, the two most efficient firms brand their products. If one of them is
the deviator, it is asked to sell in the first period at a negative price, equal
in absolute value to its continuation payoff. Otherwise, the second most ef-
ficient firm j prices at vi∗ − (xi∗ + (xj − cj) and the other firm prices at vi∗ ,
while consumers buy from the most efficient firm. This is an equilibrium for
any vi∗ ∈ [0, v]8.
Lemma 2. Any continuation payoff vector v such that vi∗ ∈ [0, v] and vj = 0
for j 6= i∗ is implementable without brands.
8Similar arrangements are possible for other punishments. For the purposes of this
paper, however, it suffices to see that vi = 0 is implementable with or without brands.
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5 Branded vs Non-Branded Collusion
Finally, I compare the relative efficiency of optimal agreements with brands
and without brands.
Proposition 3 (Main Result). For all belief systems µ(p) satisfying the In-
tuitive Criterion, δ∗ < δˆ
Proof. To establish the result I show that if a given payoff vector is imple-
mentable with Brands it is also implementable without Brands and that the
payoff vector is in the Interior of the Set. Thus, let pi be such a vector of
equilibrium payoffs induced by some agreement qˆ implementable with Brands
for a discount factor δˆ. Clearly pi is feasible without Brands by Lemma 1.
Further, since qˆ lies in the interior of the n− 1 dimensional simplex and so
pi lies in the Interior of the Feasible Set. Notice that if pi is IC with Brands
δpik ≥ (1− δ)(xk − ck) + δvkk (13)
Since by Lemma 2 I can take vk to be the same with or without brands
it suffices to show that the contemporaneous profits for k if k deviates do
not exceed xk. First, I specify an equilibrium strategy profile that deters
deviations in the Branding stage. If a firm brands its product in any period
t, the most efficient non-deviant firm becomes active and offers its product
at a price p = xn. Thus, the contemporaneous deviating payoff is at most
xi∗ − ci∗ − xn ≤ xk. If two non-deviant firms remain active, consumers buy
from the deviator, thus deterring further deviations. Finally in the following
period, the two most productive firms brand its product (if they had not
done so up to now) and follow the strategies specified in the continuation
after a price deviation. Now notice that if p > x1, no consumer buys and so
the deviation is dominated for all types. If xk+1 < p ≤ xk, and (13) holds,
the deviation is dominated for all firms whose quality is higher than k. But
then, if consumers have beliefs satisfying the Intuitive Criterion, µj(p) = 0
for all j ≤ k. Thus, consumers get negative surplus from the deviator and
should not buy. Finally, if p ≤ xn, the deviation is dominated for all firms.
Therefore, if pi is implementable for a discount factor δ with Brands, then
pi is implementable without brands. Finally notice that since pi lies in the
interior of the feasible set, there exists another IC payoff vector pi∗, such that
pi∗ > pi. Thus, all IC constraints are relaxed and δ∗ < δˆ.
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The argument is rather simple. First, Lemma 1 implies that any payoff
vector feasible with Brands is also feasible without brands. Second, if a firm
has no incentives to deviate in the presence of Brands, it must be that its
equilibrium payoff exceeds their single-period monopoly profits when con-
sumers know its quality. Thus, any price deviation induces beliefs that put
probability zero on those firms whose quality is above the price. But clearly,
this leads consumers to abstain from buying from such a firm.
5.1 Branding and Beliefs
We have assumed throughout that Brands perse do not carry information,
in the sense that consumers beliefs do not depend on the specific content
of the Brand. That is, if a firm deviates in a given period and sends a
message bi,t = Mi, consumers beliefs about the identity of the firm cannot
depend on her true identity before any purchase has been made. In this sense,
Brands allow consumers to relate current producers with previous purchasing
experiences. However, Proposition 3 would hold naturally if Brands have
meaning. The reason is that the price that a firm can charge in such a case
is at most its true quality, which is the price they charge with Brands.
6 Heterogenous Consumers and Elastic De-
mand
In this Section we study the limits of this results under more general prefer-
ences. Let v(θ, x) be the value that a consumer of type θ attaches to a good
of quality x, with θ distributed according to F (θ). We shall assume that v is
increasing in both arguments and that it satisfies the standard single-crossing
condition, so v(θ, x)− v(θ, x′) ≥ v(θ′, x)− v(θ′, x′). Further, we assume that
the monopolist would choose to offer a single product9.
Let θ(x) be the threshold consumer that maximizes profits of a firm of-
fering a product x. Notice that pi(x) = (1− F (θ(x)))v(θ(x), x). Notice that
this function is convex in x because of single-crossing and optimality of θ(x).
The following result provides a Necessary Condition for Lemma 1 to hold.
9This assumption greatly simplifies the problem by allowing us to concentrate on col-
lusive agreements represented by q.
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Lemma 4. The set of feasible payoffs with brands is a strict subset of the
set of feasible payoffs without brands only if∑
qipi(x) =
∑
qi max
θi
{(1− F (θi(x)))v(θi, xi)
≤ max
θ
(1− F (θ))
∑
qiv(θ, xi)
for all qi ∈ ∆n
Clearly, if this condition is not met, there are payoff combinations that are
reachable with Brands but not without them. Intuitively, Branding allows
firms to choose their price to maximize individual profits, while without
Brands firms are bound to choose the same price. If this loss exceeds the
benefits of cross-subsidization, then the set of feasible payoffs without Brands
is not a superset of the set of feasible payoffs without Brands. This renders
the techniques used in the Proof of Proposition 3 invalid.
Finally, notice that a Sufficient Condition for 4 to hold is that these prices
are constant, i.e., that the threshold consumer θ(xi) = θ for all xi. In such a
case, pi(x) is linear in x and a straightforward modification of the argument
presented in the Proof of Lemma 1 applies.
These conditions are very restrictive and, generically, they are met only
by a linear function v(θ, x) = α + βθx for some α ≥ 0, θ > 0 . In the
remaining of this Section I show that the result presented above extends to
this utility function.
Proposition 5. Suppose that v(θ, x) is linear. Then, δˆ > δ∗.
Proof. Since v(θ, x) is linear, for every x, the threshold consumer is θ = θ∗
and prices are p(x) = v(θ∗, x) is linear in x and so pi(x) is also linear. An
straightforward modification of Lemma 1 shows that if pˆi is feasible with
Brands it is also feasible without Brands. Suppose pˆi is implementable at δ
with Brands, then we have that
δpˆii ≤ (1− δ) max
pi
{piQ(pi, pj;xi, xj)}+ δvi (14)
for every j 6= i and for every i, where Q(pi, pj;xi, xj) is the quantity sold
by firm i given its price, and the price and identity of its competitor. Since
v satisfies the Single-Crossing Property, this deviation payoff is decreasing
in xj. Thus, the most restrictive of such constraints applies for the lowest-
quality rival. It follows that maxp{pQ(p, pj;xi, xj} ≤ maxp{pQ(p, pq;xi, xq}.
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Finally, a modification of the argument presented in Proposition 3 implies
that µ(p) must have zero probability on all firms j such that p ≤ v(θ∗, xj).
Again, by linearity, this implies that Q(p, pq;xµ(p), xq) ≤ Q(p, pq;xj, xq) for
all q. Thus, these Constraints are also sufficient for the problem without
Brands and the result follows.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a theoretical link between branding and col-
lusion in vertically differentiated markets. Our main result is that collusion
is easier to sustain without brands. The reason is twofold. First, if firms are
undistinguishable to consumers, they can relax their incentive constraints
by cross-subsidizing each other. Second, firms who deviate are punish by
consumers who hold intuitive beliefs about the identity of deviators. Inter-
estingly, in the present paper, as opposed to most of the literature, intuitive
beliefs support a pooling equilibrium without disclosure. This is the main
theoretical novelty of our work.
While cross-subsidization and punishments are likely to be present more
generally, the techniques used in this paper crucially rely on a restriction on
the utility function of consumers. By branding, different firms may position
in a different price and quantity mix and, therefore, may obtain higher profits
than without brands. Future work may shed light on the conditions in the
utility function under which branding yields higher profits and facilitates
collusion.
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